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mittment of service. The way to insure both is not by arbitrary discrimi-
nation against any specific plan. Rather, the Bar should adopt an attitude
of "watchfulness" whereby it would not automatically adjudge group legal
plans as unauthorized practice of law, but would allow their existence until
proven harmful. This, in effect, would be giving the test developed by the
Supreme Court official recognition in the Code. More importantly, it would
give the Bar a flexibility now unfortunately lacking. If the Bar really
wishes to be an effective guardian of ethical standards, it should work closely
in the development of such plans. It would be wise for the Bar to remember
that these plans have a powerful ally in the Supreme Court.
The present Code is altruistic in its formulation of the problem. How-
ever, the worthy intentions evidenced in the ethical considerations are
not borne out by the provisions of the disciplinary rules. In restricting
group legal service plans, the Bar must have a more substantial justification
for such an attitude than its contention that there is potential abuse inherent
in such plans. Even if there was general agreement on this premise, there
must still be provision for an adequate substitute by the profession. Dis-
ciplinary Rule 2-103-D, therefore, is an unrealistic and desirable rule.
The Bar's position should be carefully re-evaluated.
NORMAN A. LEBLANC, JR.
NEW YORK ABORTION REFORM AND CONFLICTING MUNICIPAL
REGULATIONS: A QUESTION OF HOME RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Abortion and its array of associated problems have been the focus of
intense controversy for at least the last decade. During the past three years,
certain states have passed "liberalized" abortion statutes,' amending laws
which have been in existence since before the Civil War. The New York
State Abortion Law of 1828 served as the original model for other state
abortion statutes, 2 and the law remained virtually unchanged until this
year. The constant legislative debate on abortion reform in New York has
been so unpredictable that the 1969 legislature rejected, by nine votes, an
abortion reform bill which would be considered restrictive as compared to
I. "Liberalization" of the abortion laws during the period of 1967-69, meant that
the states allowed abortions only if the woman would be in danger of death if the fetus
was not terminated. Colorado, North Carolina, and California enacted such statutes in
1967; Georgia and Maryland in 1968; and Arkansas, Kansas, Delaware, Oregon and New
Mexico followed in 1969. In 1970, Hawaii, Alaska, and New York passed laws which
abolished practically all restrictions on abortions. D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION LAW, CnoicE
AND MORAITY 140 (1970).
2. See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 445 (1968).
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the one passed a year later.3 The area is still engulfed in heated controversy;
the issues ranging from the rights of the fetus, to the religious dogma of
various churches, to the possibility of turning New York into an "abortion
mill."4
The unfortunate part of this emotional discussion and public fervor is
that it tends to hide the real issues underlying abortion reform. The original
abortion statutes resulted from a fear for the life of the mother, not because
the state wished to confer rights on an unborn child or acknowledge popular
religious beliefs. 5 Abortion with the mother's consent, before quickening,6
was simply not a crime at common law.t As the 1858 New Jersey Supreme
Court said in upholding a conviction under that state's abortion statute, the
purpose of the law was not to "prevent the procuring of abortions, so much
as to guard the health and life of the mother against the consequences of
such attempts."8 Therefore, any examination of abortion must center around
improvements in medical knowledge and technique, to discover whether it
is safe to return the abortion decision back to the mother. The California
Supreme Court, in the recent case of People v. Belous,9 expressly noted that
the purpose of the old abortion laws was a concern over the mother's health
and concluded that this concern was no longer justified. Striking down the
California abortion law, the court stated, "it is now safer for a woman to
have a hospital therapeutic abortion during the first trimester than to bear
a child."'1 Abortion proponents suggest that the real danger to the health
3. Summarily, the 1969 version of the abortion reform bill allowed abortions when
there existed medical evidence that:
a) the continuation of pregnancy would endanger the life of the woman.
b) the child would be grossly malformed or would have mental or physical
defects so as to be permanently unable to take care of himself.
c) continuation of pregnancy would gravely endanger the life of the woman.
d) pregnancy resulted from first degree rape or incest or the pregnancy occur-
red when the woman was 15 years old or less.
e) pregnancy occurred while the woman was declared to be a mental incompetent.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1969, at 48, col. 4.
4. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, at 47, col. 1. Members of the state legislature
who lost the latest abortion fight still vow to place amended restrictions on the newly
passed law.
5. Means, supra note 2, at 413.
6. While the definition of quickening has varied historically, it is currently con-
sidered that part of the fetal development which occurs sometime between the sixteenth
and twentieth week of gestation. The exact moment of quickening varies from woman
to woman, pregnancy to pregnancy.
7. Means, supra note 2, at 428.
8. State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1858).
9. 71 Cal. 2d 944, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
10. Id. at 965, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360. But see United States v. Vuitch,
305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969), where the court stated, "While there have been
many advances in medical technique since 1901, there is nothing before the Court which
establishes that abortions may be safely and hygienically performed at various stages of
pregnancy except under medical direction."
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of the mother no longer results from medical deficiencies, but from the law
itself. By making a relatively safe operation criminal, women are being
forced to endure the risks and dangers associated with the unprofessional
abortionist in order to free themselves of an unwanted fetus."
In consideration of this contemporary outlook, New York has enacted
an abortion reform bill which is both brief and to the point:
3. Justifiable abortional act. An abortional act is justifiable
when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed
physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is neces-
sary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission
of an abortion act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the
advice of a duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary
to preserve her life, or (2) within twenty-four weeks from the com-
mencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an
abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is being com-
mitted by a duly licensed physician acting under a reasonable belief
that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or within twenty-
four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy.12
The statute's brevity points toward a specific legislative intent. As Assembly-
man Peter Berle, one of the sponsors of the abortion reform bill in the
Assembly, has stated:
[O]ne of the most important things that we felt we were doing
when we brought the legislation out in its current form was that we
would be preserving freedom of -choice and insuring freedom of
choice with respect to the individual herself.'3
Apparently the legislators felt that any limitations on the right to an
abortion would seriously curtail the individual's "freedom of choice" which
medical advances seemed to justify.
The immediate response of the Department of Health of the City of
New York to this virtually unrestricted legislation was the issuance of recom-
mended guidelines concerning the performance of abortions.14 After the
City conducted hearings on the matter,6 the recommendations were in-
corporated into the New York City Health Code, with violations carrying
the penalty of a misdemeanor crime.16 Generally these guidelines call for the
performance of abortions:
11. Means, supra note 2, at 504.
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
13. Public Hearing on Proposed Amendment (Article 42-Abortion Services to New
York City Health Code), New York City Board of Health 78 (1970).
14. These recommendations followed from a study conducted by the Obstetric Ad-
visory Committee to the Commissioner of Health. Recommended Standards for Perform-
ance of Abortions, Bureau of Maternity Services and Family Planning, Dep't of Health
of the City of New York, June, 1970 (mimeo).
15. Public Hearing, supra note 13, at 78.
16. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE art. 42, § 42.09 (1970).
526
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-In a hospital-on an outpatient basis up to the 12th week of
pregnancy, on an inpatient basis after 12 weeks.
-In a clinic affiliated with a hospital, provided the traveling time
from clinic to hospital is no more than 10 minutes, the maximum
time allowable to transfer a patient in the event of an emer-
gency.....
-In an independent clinic, if it has a blood bank, a laboratory
equipped to perform necessary tests, a skilled medical staff, proper
anesthetic equipment and an operating room equipped for ab-
dominal surgery.
A physician's private office would qualify under the third cate-
gory if it contained all the required equipment and personnel.
Not many doctors are expected to so equip and staff their offices.'1
In effect, the standards set down by the City Department of Health, make
performance of an abortion possible only in licensed hospitals and extremely
well-staffed clinics. Considering the fact that the state legislature defeated
an amendment to the new law which contained many of the same restric-
tions on the performance of abortions,18 the City Department justifies its
recommendations on the grounds that there is a need to "provide public
health standards of care in the performance of abortions, with proper regard
for the health, safety and well-being of the patient."' 9
The purpose of this comment is to examine the validity of the New
York City restrictions in light of the apparent intent of the state legislation
to allow the performance of abortions solely as a matter of judgment
between the patient and her physician. To explore this issue there are three
fundamental legal requirements which the local legislation must fulfill:
1) it must be a valid exercise of municipal police power;20 2) it must not
abridge any fundamental legal rights granted by the federal constitution;
2
'
3) finally, it must not be inconsistent with any area of state legislation or
be in an area in which the state has preempted local legislation.
22
II. ANALYSIS OF FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Grant of Power
The most fundamental issue in examining the validity of local legis-
lation is whether the municipality has authority to legislate over the par-
ticular subject matter.2 3 The source of all municipal legislative authority
17. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1970, at 24, col. 6.
18. Public Hearing, supra note 13, at 38.
19. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE art. 42, Introductory Notes (1970).
20. See Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-1965: Retrospect and Prospect, 15
BUFFALO L. REv. 335, 348 (1965).
21. Id. at 352.
22. Id. at 354.
23. Id. at 348.
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is either the state constitution 24 or a specific grant of power from the state
legislature. 25 New York City, and all other municipal governments, receive
a grant of power to regulate in matters of health through the New York
State Constitution, which states that local government shall have the power
to regulate "[t]he government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and
well-being of persons or property therein."2 6 There is a further grant of
power by the legislature which deals specifically with city regulations on
matters of health. This grant is contained in the New York General City
Law; it authorizes the cities:
To maintain order, enforce the laws, protect property and preserve
and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said
purposes to regulate and license occupations and businesses.27
There is a strong presumption of constitutionality which accompanies
municipal legislation, because of the general language used in the grants
of power to municipal government. 28 Moreover, when the grant of power
comes directly from the constitution, courts will view the local legislation
with the same presumption of validity as they would state legislation.2D
This follows logically from the fact that state legislative power, like local
governmental authority, results directly from the state constitution. In the
absence of inconsistency with, or preemption by, state legislation, municipal
legislation will be presumed a necessary and proper function of local gov-
ernment.
There are obvious restrictions on this affirmative grant of power. The
municipal law must not be arbitrary or capriciousA0 and it must have a
reasonably stated purpose which relates to the sought after effect.3' The
decision as to whether the legislation has a reasonable purpose and effect
24. N.Y. CONsT. art. 9, § 2.
25. See N.Y. MuN. HomE RuLE LAw (McKinney 1969).
26. N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(c)(2), 10.
27. N.Y. GEN. Crry LAw § 20(13) (McKinney 1968).
28. E.g., People v. McGuire, 313 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (Long Beach City Ct. 1970), whcre
the court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use of surfboards on city beaches without
a permit or license: "The presumption of constitutionality of a statute is a strong one,
and in order to declare a law unconstitutional, its invalidity must be demonstrated
beyond a reasonable doubt."
29. See, e.g., Stracquadanio v. Dep't of Health, 285 N.Y. 93, 97, 32 N.E.2d 806, 808
(1941). See also Hyman, supra note 20, at 354.
30. Hill Packing Co. v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 742, 747, 49 N.Y.S.2d 773, 778
(Sup. Ct. 1944).
31. E.g., Nicholas Herkimer Corp. v. Village of Herkimer, 34 App. Div. 2d 371, 373,
312 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (4th Dep't 1970), quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525
(1934). "However, the welfare of a community is best served only where laws are enacted
which are '. . . not ... unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and ... the means selected
. . . have a real and substantial relationship to the object sought to be obtained.'"
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depends on the facts of the case 32 and a balancing of them against the
coinciding public policy. 3 In the present case it appears that the purpose
of the law is concern for the mother's health,3 4 and without further empirical
evidence as to the effect of the legislation, it appears that the New York
City abortion restrictions would fall within the initial presumption of
validity.
B. Constitutionally Protected Rights
Once the legislation has been established as being derived from an
affirmative grant of power, it is subject to examination at both the federal
and state constitutional levels.&3 5 The enforcement of the legislation must
not violate the constitutional protections of due process and equal protec-
tion, nor abridge any other fundamental legal right.36 In the area under
consideration, recent cases indicate the recognition of a newly emerging
right to abortion.3 7 In striking down the California abortion restrictions the
state supreme court said:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's re-
peated acknowledgement of a right of privacy or liberty' in matters
related to marriage, family, and sex.38
When the state, or in our case, a municipality, then takes steps to regulate
a fundamental legal right of an individual, it must do so in a fashion which
does not violate the concept of liberty implicit in the due process and the
equal protection clauses of the federal constitution.m 3 9 It must serve a com-
32. Streb v. City of Rochester, 32 Misc. 2d 29, 31, 222 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sup. Ct.
1961). In voiding restrictions on certain types of elevators, of which there was only one
in the entire City of Rochester, the supreme court said, "the question as to whether an
ordinance enacted under such power complies with the rule of reasonableness depends
upon the facts and circumstances of the considered matter and the character of the
ordinance."
33. City of Buffalo v. Linsman, 113 App. Div. 584, 98 N.Y.S. 737 (4th Dep't 1906).
Where the City of Buffalo tried to restrict the sale of produce to certain hours, the
court said: "We are unable to see how it was necessary or proper to insert this pro-
vision in the ordinance. The design was quite apparent-to benefit grocers and shop-
keepers dealing in such articles as the peddlers sold." Id. at 585, 98 N.Y.S. at 738.
34. Recommended Standards, supra note 14. "Two basic considerations underlie
these guidelines or recommended standards. First and foremost is [the] safety of the
patient." Id. at 1.
35. Hyman, supra note 20, at 352-53.
36. Id. at 353.
37. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359
(1969).
38. Id.
39. E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937). While rejecting the appel-
lant's theory that protection from double jeopardy is a fundamental legal right, the
Court said: "In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against the federal
government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found
to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and thus through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment become invalid against the states." Id.
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pelling public interest without blatantly impinging upon the individual's
constitutionally protected rights.40
In order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the munic-
ipal legislation,4a it is necessary to show that there has been a substantial
obstruction of the exercise of a fundamental legal right.42 If the real effect
of the New York City abortion restrictions, as a New York Times survey
suggests, is to prevent some women from obtaining abortions, 43 then there
may not be a sufficient public interest (i.e., protection of the mother's
health) to overcome this substantial interference with a woman's right to
decide whether to bear children. After examining the effects of the first
three weeks of operation of New York City's regulations, the Times con-
cluded:
[T]he road to a hospital abortion often included seeming end-
less delays, clerical errors, complicated procedures, high costs and
gratuitous psychological trauma.
Faced with such difficulties, many women-especially the poor,
poorly educated, timid, embarassed, frightened and unaggressive-
are finding hospital abortions impossible to obtain.44
If, with time, this initial survey proves to be a trend, it is doubtful in light
of less than conclusive evidence as to the necessity of hospital abortions, 45
that the legislation could meet the basic constitutional standards to sustain
its validity.
C. Preemption and Inconsistency
In granting powers to the municipalities, the New York State Con-
stitution hardly gives "carte blanche" power to local governments to regu-
40. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
41. E.g., Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1948). See also
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). "The day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions because they may be unwise, im-
provident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Id.
42. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
43. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1970, at 29, col. 1 (City ed.).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Besides the passionate pleas both for and against the City abortion restrictions,
the evidence given at the public hearing can be broken down into a debate between two
theories of medical technique, and the end result is inconclusive at best. These include
those who favor the restrictions because they fear the possibility of the danger of some-
thing going wrong: "The guidelines which you have promulgated, we believe, are sound.
The suggestions that we are making are intended to assure the safety of the procedure
for the patient. It is not compromised in any way." Public Hearing, supra note 13, at
32. Those doctors who speak with personal experience of new techniques say: "As a conse-
quence of our research in the past year, we have terminated over 1,000 pregnancies
without the need to dilate the cervix, without having to displace the uterus and without
the use of anesthetics except in twenty per cent of the cases where a mild local was used.
"Obviously, there is little comparison with this method to the typical hospital abor-
tion." Id. at 154-55.
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late their own affairs.4 6 While article nine of the New York State Constitu-
don grants municipalities the right to pass laws relating to the "property,
affairs or government of such local government," 47 it also goes on to limit
the scope of this legislation:
[E]very local government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution
or any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or
not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local
government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict
the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the prop-
erty, affairs or government of such local government.48
Therefore, even if the local law is in pursuance of an affirmative grant of
power under the state constitution or another state law, it might still be
invalid because, in effect, state legislation has preempted the entire area,49
or the local legislation is inconsistent with the existing state legislation. 50
The origins of these limitations on the constitutional grant to local
power date back to 1924; this limitation has subsequently prefaced every
affirmative grant of power to municipalities. 51 While each constitutional
convention seems willing to grant more power to the municipality, this
phrase has always served to limit a liberal judicial interpretation.52 In effect,
the courts have "narrowly construed grants of local legislative power and
have been quick to find valid state laws which have the effect of preempting
the field in which a locality has attempted to legislate." 53
There is a great deal of difficulty in distinguishing between preemption
and inconsistency. The former seems to be determined by the quantity of
state legislation in an area, and whether the state has "enacted a compre-
hensive program as reflected in statutory law to protect the safety, morals,
health and general welfare of all the citizens of the State .... 54 The in-
consistency argument centers around whether the local law is in some way
46. Such power has been attributed to both the constitution and the courts.
"Throughout the history of constitutional home rule there runs a thread of consistency
- the phenomenon of continued effort by cities to obtain constitutional protection against
legislative abuse, crowned by apparent success in obtaining constitutional guarantees
and presently set at naught by judicial interpretation of imprecise constitutional lan-
guage." Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54 COLUM. L. Rv.
311, 315 (1954).
47. N.Y. CoNsr. art. 9, § 2(c)(2).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Richland, Property, Affairs and Government, Proceedings Municipal Law
Seminar, in NEv YORK STATE OFFICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 35, 37 (1963).
50. N.Y. CONsr. art. 9, § 2(c)(2).
51. Hyman, supra note 20, at 355.
52. Richland, supra note 46, at 315.
53. Richland, supra note 49, at 37.
54. Hepper v. Town of Hillsdale, 63 Misc. 2d 447, 449, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (Sup.
Ct. 1970).
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contrary to the purpose and effect of state legislation.55 While the munici-
pality is certainly free to regulate, it must confine itself to follow the general
intent of the legislature, except where it can show that "there is a real
distinction between the city and other parts of the state." 0 The difficulty
arises when one tries to visualize the court holding local legislation, which
is in complete harmony with the state law, void because of preemption.
Unless there is an obvious effort by the state to control the subject matter,
the distinction is very tenuous.5 7
A recent analogue to the New York City abortion restrictions serves to
illustrate the difficulty in making distinctions between preemption and
inconsistency; it is exemplary of the court's traditional handling of problems
which develop in this area. In Heppar v. Town of Hillsdale,58 the Supreme
Court of Columbia County, New York, invalidated a town ordinance which
made it a misdemeanor to treat a drug addict. While conceding that the
municipalities had a "loosely defined power" 9 to regulate matters of this
kind, the court went on to say:
Of course, municipalities and other political subdivisions of the
state may not exercise the police power in such a way as to conflict
with organic laws of statewide application60
There were enough statutes designed to produce a comprehensive state
program, and therefore the area was preempted"' by the state "and all ordi-
nances of political subdivisions in conflict with that general law must
fall."6 2 The court found that the state had made addict rehabilitation a
state concern, thus a municipality was not allowed to act to the contrary.
While the court claimed that the state had preempted the area, implying
that no municipal legislation was necessary, it found it necessary to qualify
the preemption in terms of inconsistency with state law. 3
55. S.H. Kress Sc Co. v. Dep't of Health, 258 App. Div. 780, 15 N.Y.S.2d 722, rev'd,
283 N.Y. 55, 59, 27 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1940).
56. Id. See also People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 50, 64 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1945), where
the court said: "The differences between the State law and the local law are not of such
a character as to render one inconsistent with the other. The local law supplements the
state law by providing heavier penalties for black-market transactions in New York
City of the gravest consequence to the property, safety and health of its crowded popula-
tion, dependent upon thousands of small shopkeepers from whom the daily necessities
must be purchased."
57. In Hepper v. Town of Hillsdale, 63 Misc. 2d 447, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup, Ct.
1970), the court held that in light of all the state legislation encouraging rehabilitation
of drug addicts, the municipality was preempted from entering the area. However, this
applies only to legislation in conflict with state law. Presumably the qualification of
preemption is inconsistency.
58. 63 Misc. 2d 447, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
59. Id. at 449, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
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In the abortion situation, New York City has regulated the scope of
state legislation. There does not appear to be sufficient state legislation, both
in quantity and scope, to conclude that the state has preempted the entire
area of abortion regulation. 4 The authors of the state abortion reform
law intended to have abortions treated "the same as any other medical
act."65 Presumably the state intended the municipalities to have some free-
dom to regulate abortions in order to effectuate the abortion right in light
of the needs of the local area. However, this does not mean that New York
City has authority to pass legislation which would be inconsistent with the
intent of the legislature. Assemblyman Leichter, one of the authors of the
state abortion reform law, stated at the hearings conducted by the City
Health Department:
There is no need for the regulations which have been proposed,
or for any regulations dealing with abortions as distinguished from
other medical practices. You will be circumscribing and limiting a
law which was purposely unlimited and, in my opinion, you are
countervening the intent of the legislature. 6
Whether or not Assemblyman Leichter's opinion will have practical con-
sequences will depend, to a great extent, upon the ultimate effect of the
the New York City abortion restrictions. Early results have pointed towards
a corruption of state legislative intent. In many cases women are being
forced, because of the long delays in obtaining abortion appointments in
hospitals, to forego having an abortion during the first twelve weeks, and
instead they must undergo the more costly and more dangerous operation
associated with later fetal development.67 Even more distressing is the fact
that there is little evidence to show that the new state abortion law has
done anything to solve the problem of the illegal abortionist: "As many
women as ever are being admitted to city hospitals after botched, presumably
unprofessional, abortions."68 It appears that instead of going through the
extra expense, the bureaucratic impersonalization and the delay associated
with abortions in the city hospitals, women are still willing to subject them-
selves to the risks of illegal abortions.
In light of the fact that courts traditionally have been willing to
broadly construe the doctrines of inconsistency and preemption,69 the De-
partment of Health of the City of New York might have a difficult time
64. Compare the legislation in this area with minimum wage standards; (see Whole-
sale Laundry Board of Trades Inc. v. City of New York, 17 App. Div. 2d 327, 234
N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 998, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962)); and, the laws of
drug addict rehabilitation; (See Hepper v. Town of Hillsdale, 63 Misc. 2d 447, 311
N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1970)).
65. Public Hearing, supra note 13, at 37.
66. Id. at 39.
67. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1970, at 29, col. 1.
68. Id.
69. Richland, supra note 49, at 37.
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sustaining the validity of its legislation. The state legislature passed a law
over the objections of many people; it clearly spoke out in the area; in fact,
it rejected an amendment to the present law very much similar to the one
passed by New York City.70 There is no compelling distinction to be made
between the actual performance of an abortion in New York City and any-
where else in the state. 1 If we rigidly define preemption in terms of legisla-
tive intent, it would be logical to conclude that the state has preempted this
area from a restriction on the abortion right. If the municipality wishes to
regulate abortions, it must do so in a way which will affirmatively effectuate
the right, rather that restrict it, for restrictions have been preempted by the
stateY2 The effects of the New York City regulations are directly at variance
with the purpose of the state abortion reform bill. While the law was passed
to protect the mother's health, the regulations seem to have forced many
women who are unable to fight the system to go back to the neighborhood
abortionist.
III. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, New York City has attempted to restrict the newly
emerging right of women to have abortions. The necessity for the city's
limited control is said to be the same as the prohibitory control under the
old state abortion law; that is, the health of women. 3 In an effort to insure
the safety of the woman during the abortion operation, the city has im-
posed regulations which run directly contrary to the state legislation.74 In
considering abortion reform, the state specifically removed as many re-
strictions as possible from the operation; 75 it left the decision totally to the
woman and her physician.
The problem which develops in applying the preemption-inconsistency
doctrine is that we give credence to the denial of the theory of home rule:
a theory championed by legal scholars.76 In the case of abortion, however,
we come very close to the test applied in a possible abridgement of federal
constitutional rights. Therefore, the question of home-rule, as perceived in
the abortion context, goes far beyond any simple application of preemption
or inconsistency rationale.
70. Public Hearing, supra note 13, at 79.
71. Even though it is recognized that the uniquity of New York City is distinguish-
able in certain other areas.
72. See Hepper v. Town of Hillsdale, 63 Misc. 2d 447, 449, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741
(Sup. CL 1970).
73. See People v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1859); N.Y.C. HEALTIH CODE
art. 42, Introductory Notes (1970).
74. Public Hearing, supra note 13, at 38.
75. Id. at 78.
76. See Hyman, supra note 20, at 355; Richland, supra note 49, at 37.
COMMENTS
The ideal, of course, would be to allow municipalities primary jurisdic-
tion in matters concerning their own particular interest, without letting
their sometime pedestrian concern destroy effective, progressive statewide
legislation. Whether or not this can be effectuated remains ultimately in
the hands of the courts. In light of the state constitutional limitation of "in-
consistency,"T7 the courts must determine the basis for invalidating local
legislation by weighing the advantages of both municipal and state control
of the particular area. Without acceptance of this responsibility, the power
will rest totally with the state, as it does now,78 or totally with the munici-
pality, as it would after constitutional revision. Neither one of these pros-
pects seems particularly advantageous.
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THE NON-CONSENSUAL KILLING OF AN UNBORN INFANT:
A CRIMINAL ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Keeler v. Superior Court, the defendant, convinced that his wife
was pregnant with another man's child, assaulted her exclaiming, "I'm
going to stomp it out of you."' Proceeding to do just that, he repeatedly
kicked the woman in the abdomen and killed the almost full-term fetus.
In response to his resultant prosecution for murder, Keeler sought a writ
of prohibition to stay prosecution on the ground that the fetus was not a
human being within the meaning of the California homicide statute. 2
The ensuing courtroom battles revolved around the question of when
a fetus becomes a human being for purposes of the criminal law. Debate
on this question is possessed of a long history and is indicative of a con-
tinuing inability to resolve the legal implications of the killing of an unborn
child.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Pre-Common Law
Certain primitive cultures determined whether a crime had been com-
mitted in respect to the killing of an unborn infant by considering the
factors of convenience and necessity.3 For example, a wife's fear that her
77. N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(c)(2).
78. Comment, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1145,
1149 (1966).
1. 2 Cal. 3d 619, -, 470 P.2d 617, 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 482 (1970).
2. Id. at -, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
3. For a complete history of primitive societies' treatment of the killing of an
unborn infant, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion -Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo.
L.J. 395 (1961).
